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Engaging Non State Armed Groups in Security Sector Stabilization
Security sector stabilization enables the necessary minimum security and justice conditions to prepare for longer-term security sector reform. CSO’s security sector stabilization programs seek to prevent the recruitment and radicalization of potential terrorists and encourages defections and re-integration of combatants. Examples of this work include disengaging and reintegrating former combatants, mapping non-state armed groups (NSAGs), and reintegrating other groups such as war veterans into society. |
Academic Works (Published)
Fueling Factionalism? The Impact of Peace Processes on Rebel Group Fragmentation in Civil Wars
Allard Duursm and Feike Fliervoe
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002720958062
Abstract: While peace processes increase the likelihood that a civil war is resolved, they can also complicate peace by increasing the risk of rebel fragmentation. In this article, we argue that negotiations exacerbate pre-existing structural and substantial divisions within rebel organizations, therefore increasing the likelihood of a rebel split. More specifically, we put forward a theoretical framework that specifies why factions within a rebel group may disagree with the onset of negotiations, the conclusion of a peace agreement, or the implementation of an agreement—and thus break away during the peace process. We empirically assess the merit of this framework by systematically comparing the impact of these phases in a peace process on the fragmentation of rebel organizations. Using data that more accurately reflect the moment a rebel split takes place than earlier studies, we find that peace processes have a greater substantial impact on rebel fragmentation than previously assumed.
Allard Duursm and Feike Fliervoe
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0022002720958062
Abstract: While peace processes increase the likelihood that a civil war is resolved, they can also complicate peace by increasing the risk of rebel fragmentation. In this article, we argue that negotiations exacerbate pre-existing structural and substantial divisions within rebel organizations, therefore increasing the likelihood of a rebel split. More specifically, we put forward a theoretical framework that specifies why factions within a rebel group may disagree with the onset of negotiations, the conclusion of a peace agreement, or the implementation of an agreement—and thus break away during the peace process. We empirically assess the merit of this framework by systematically comparing the impact of these phases in a peace process on the fragmentation of rebel organizations. Using data that more accurately reflect the moment a rebel split takes place than earlier studies, we find that peace processes have a greater substantial impact on rebel fragmentation than previously assumed.
Risks versus Transformational Opportunities in Gender-Responsive Security Sector Reform.
Eleanor Gordon et al. (2020)
https://academic.oup.com/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa028/5859572?redirectedFrom=fulltext
This article investigates the gap between policy and practice in gender-responsive security sector reform (SSR) by exploring the ways in which risks perceived to be associated with gender-responsive SSR in conflict-affected environments legitimize inaction. A typology of risks is presented, which range from risks to individuals, security sector institutions, and peacebuilding efforts and encompass security, programmatic, fiduciary, and reputational risks. The risks are analyzed to consider the extent to which they are present and could be managed, mitigated, or avoided, rather than stall action. This article argues that the process of determining what constitutes a risk, and what constitutes a risk worth taking, is inherently political and serves to reinforce dominant power relations, including gendered power relations. The article then discusses the risks that result from inaction and the opportunities that are missed when arguments about risk trump gender responsiveness. As a result, it is argued that gender inequalities persist, women continue to be marginalized within and beyond the security sector, and transformational opportunities that could lead to sustainable peace are missed. The article concludes by arguing that the potential risks resulting from not advancing gender-responsive SSR far outweigh the perceived risks associated with it.
Eleanor Gordon et al. (2020)
https://academic.oup.com/jogss/advance-article-abstract/doi/10.1093/jogss/ogaa028/5859572?redirectedFrom=fulltext
This article investigates the gap between policy and practice in gender-responsive security sector reform (SSR) by exploring the ways in which risks perceived to be associated with gender-responsive SSR in conflict-affected environments legitimize inaction. A typology of risks is presented, which range from risks to individuals, security sector institutions, and peacebuilding efforts and encompass security, programmatic, fiduciary, and reputational risks. The risks are analyzed to consider the extent to which they are present and could be managed, mitigated, or avoided, rather than stall action. This article argues that the process of determining what constitutes a risk, and what constitutes a risk worth taking, is inherently political and serves to reinforce dominant power relations, including gendered power relations. The article then discusses the risks that result from inaction and the opportunities that are missed when arguments about risk trump gender responsiveness. As a result, it is argued that gender inequalities persist, women continue to be marginalized within and beyond the security sector, and transformational opportunities that could lead to sustainable peace are missed. The article concludes by arguing that the potential risks resulting from not advancing gender-responsive SSR far outweigh the perceived risks associated with it.
Commander–community ties after civil war
Philip A Martin
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320929744
Ex-rebel military commanders play a central role in peacebuilding after civil war. Yet the influence and mobilization power of these actors is not uniform: in some areas commanders retain strong ties to civilian populations after war’s end, while in other areas such ties wither away. This article analyses a novel dataset of former rebel-occupied localities in Côte d’Ivoire to investigate why commander–community linkages endure or decline after post-conflict transitions. The findings support a theory of political accountability: commanders retained political capital and access to networks of supporters in areas where insurgents provided essential goods to civilians during war. By contrast, where insurgents’ wartime rule involved abuse and coercion, commanders were less likely to sustain strong ties. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that violent warlordism explains the persistence of rebel commanders’ power in peacetime. Rather, effective wartime governance may create regionally embedded strongmen who can in turn disrupt postwar state-building.
Keywords accountability, Côte d’Ivoire, post-conflict reconstruction, rebel governance, warlords
Philip A Martin
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022343320929744
Ex-rebel military commanders play a central role in peacebuilding after civil war. Yet the influence and mobilization power of these actors is not uniform: in some areas commanders retain strong ties to civilian populations after war’s end, while in other areas such ties wither away. This article analyses a novel dataset of former rebel-occupied localities in Côte d’Ivoire to investigate why commander–community linkages endure or decline after post-conflict transitions. The findings support a theory of political accountability: commanders retained political capital and access to networks of supporters in areas where insurgents provided essential goods to civilians during war. By contrast, where insurgents’ wartime rule involved abuse and coercion, commanders were less likely to sustain strong ties. These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that violent warlordism explains the persistence of rebel commanders’ power in peacetime. Rather, effective wartime governance may create regionally embedded strongmen who can in turn disrupt postwar state-building.
Keywords accountability, Côte d’Ivoire, post-conflict reconstruction, rebel governance, warlords
Who Punishes the Leader? Leader Culpability and Coups during Civil War
Jun Koga Suddut
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002720950429
Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implication for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts led by those outside the leaders’ ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition. The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they consider whether to fight or settle.
Jun Koga Suddut
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002720950429
Who punishes leaders via coups during civil war? By distinguishing between different types of internal audiences within the government and their attempts to remove a leader forcefully, I illuminate the mechanisms that explain variation in who punishes the leader during wartime. I claim that whether leaders are culpable for the initiation of the war has an important implication for whether they are punished by members of the ruling coalition (i.e., those with access to decision-making and political power), or by those outside the ruling coalition. Empirical evidence supports my hypotheses: (i) culpable leaders are more likely to experience coup attempts led by those outside the leaders’ ruling coalition, should the war go poorly; and (ii) nonculpable leaders are more likely to experience coups executed by members of their ruling coalition. The findings have important implications for how leaders respond to audience pressures as they consider whether to fight or settle.
Military Coalitions and the Problem of Wartime Cooperation
Scott Wolford
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/XLVZOI/Q0V8QS&version=1.2
Military coalitions are everywhere in international politics: deterring wars, waging wars (when deterrence fails), and enforcing (or tolerating) the peace that follows. Alex Weisiger’s recent ISQ article, “Exiting the Coalition,” (2016) studies the challenges of sustaining military cooperation during interstate wars, showing that coalition partners are more likely to pull out of the war effort when fighting separately from their partners and when things aren’t going well on the battlefield—two factors that make cooperation difficult to sustain even in the face of the side payments that often secure military cooperation. The contributors to this symposium, Marina Henke and Daniel Morey, engage Weisiger’s study by exploring the limits of specific coding rules and how they relate to underlying concepts of abandonment (versus, say, entrapment) and the extent to which a coalition’s aims are fixed (across either time or the membership). In his response, Weisiger notes that coding rules generally hold up to some specific objections, but he also argues that his key hypotheses should be robust even to the possibility that states try to compensate their partners to prevent abandonment when things go poorly on the battlefield.1 It’s a rich symposium on a topic that feels very present—especially as (a) coalition efforts continue against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and (b) the peacetime coalition that has managed the Postwar global order for over seven decades has begun to show some cracks in its foundations.
Scott Wolford
https://dataverse.harvard.edu/file.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/XLVZOI/Q0V8QS&version=1.2
Military coalitions are everywhere in international politics: deterring wars, waging wars (when deterrence fails), and enforcing (or tolerating) the peace that follows. Alex Weisiger’s recent ISQ article, “Exiting the Coalition,” (2016) studies the challenges of sustaining military cooperation during interstate wars, showing that coalition partners are more likely to pull out of the war effort when fighting separately from their partners and when things aren’t going well on the battlefield—two factors that make cooperation difficult to sustain even in the face of the side payments that often secure military cooperation. The contributors to this symposium, Marina Henke and Daniel Morey, engage Weisiger’s study by exploring the limits of specific coding rules and how they relate to underlying concepts of abandonment (versus, say, entrapment) and the extent to which a coalition’s aims are fixed (across either time or the membership). In his response, Weisiger notes that coding rules generally hold up to some specific objections, but he also argues that his key hypotheses should be robust even to the possibility that states try to compensate their partners to prevent abandonment when things go poorly on the battlefield.1 It’s a rich symposium on a topic that feels very present—especially as (a) coalition efforts continue against ISIL in Iraq and Syria and (b) the peacetime coalition that has managed the Postwar global order for over seven decades has begun to show some cracks in its foundations.
Academic Works (Contemporary/Developing )
Trends in External Military Aid to Civil War Combatants, 1946–2009
Noel Anderson, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
Memo for Readers: Dear readers, Thank you so much for taking the time to read a draft chapter from my book project. The attached remains very much a work in progress, so your input will go a long way. In this memo, I wanted to provide some context for the chapter to help situate it within my larger book project. My book manuscript, Wars Without End: Competitive Intervention, explores two interrelated puzzles about external intervention Consequences for Internal Con and internal war. The rst asks why rebels, governments, and third-party interveners often continue to invest in costly and protracted con icts rather than sue for peace and a negotiated settlement. The second considers the consequences of these behaviors for temporal variation in the average duration and global prevalence of civil wars. A central nding that emerges concerns the critical role of what I call intervention—two sided, simultaneous military assistance competitive from di erent third-party states to both government and rebel combatants—in the dynamics and intractability of civil wars across time and around the globe. Developing a generalizable theory of competitive intervention, the book explains the distortionary e ects this form of external meddling has on domestic bargaining processes, describes the unique strategic dilemmas it entails for third-party interveners, and links its varying prevalence to international systemic change. Importantly, data collection is not yet entirely nished, and so the dataset remains incomplete.
Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War
Noel Anderson, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.
Noel Anderson, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
Memo for Readers: Dear readers, Thank you so much for taking the time to read a draft chapter from my book project. The attached remains very much a work in progress, so your input will go a long way. In this memo, I wanted to provide some context for the chapter to help situate it within my larger book project. My book manuscript, Wars Without End: Competitive Intervention, explores two interrelated puzzles about external intervention Consequences for Internal Con and internal war. The rst asks why rebels, governments, and third-party interveners often continue to invest in costly and protracted con icts rather than sue for peace and a negotiated settlement. The second considers the consequences of these behaviors for temporal variation in the average duration and global prevalence of civil wars. A central nding that emerges concerns the critical role of what I call intervention—two sided, simultaneous military assistance competitive from di erent third-party states to both government and rebel combatants—in the dynamics and intractability of civil wars across time and around the globe. Developing a generalizable theory of competitive intervention, the book explains the distortionary e ects this form of external meddling has on domestic bargaining processes, describes the unique strategic dilemmas it entails for third-party interveners, and links its varying prevalence to international systemic change. Importantly, data collection is not yet entirely nished, and so the dataset remains incomplete.
Competitive Intervention, Protracted Conflict, and the Global Prevalence of Civil War
Noel Anderson, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Toronto
This article develops a theory of competitive intervention in civil war to explain variation in the global prevalence of intrastate conflict. I describe the distortionary effects competitive interventions have on domestic bargaining processes and explain the unique strategic dilemmas they entail for third-party interveners. The theory uncovers the conditional nature of intervention under the shadow of inadvertent escalation and moves beyond popular anecdotes about “proxy wars” by deriving theoretically grounded propositions about the strategic logics motivating intervener behaviors. I then link temporal variation in patterns of competitive intervention to recent decreases in the prevalence and average duration of internal conflicts. The theory is tested with a quantitative analysis of all civil wars fought between 1975 and 2009 and a qualitative case study of the Angolan civil war (1975–1991). My results underscore the importance of a generalizable account of competitive intervention that not only explains past conflicts, but also informs contemporary policy.
Information, Agency, and Return Intentions: Evidence from Displacement following the Battle for Mosul
Jacob Aronson, Jonathan Hall, Paul Huth, James Igoe Walsh
Abstract: Armed conflicts often result in large-scale internal displacement. Post-war recovery can be facilitated by the return of former inhabitants. When and why do displaced persons express an intention to return? A crucial and overlooked challenge facing displaced populations is uncertainty about how to address potentially challenging conditions in their area of origin. While displaced persons can receive conflicting information from multiple sources, we argue that civilians are more likely to express an intention to return when they receive information from a source perceived to have insider and unbiased information. This increases their sense of self-efficacy and allows them to better prepare for and address hazards. Statistical analysis of a large representative survey of displaced households in Iraq demonstrates strong support for our theory. This impact was largest for those individuals who identified information access as important to their return decisions.
Note: This This material is based upon work supported by the U. S. Army Research Office through the Minerva Initiative under grant number W911NF1810089.
Jacob Aronson, Jonathan Hall, Paul Huth, James Igoe Walsh
Abstract: Armed conflicts often result in large-scale internal displacement. Post-war recovery can be facilitated by the return of former inhabitants. When and why do displaced persons express an intention to return? A crucial and overlooked challenge facing displaced populations is uncertainty about how to address potentially challenging conditions in their area of origin. While displaced persons can receive conflicting information from multiple sources, we argue that civilians are more likely to express an intention to return when they receive information from a source perceived to have insider and unbiased information. This increases their sense of self-efficacy and allows them to better prepare for and address hazards. Statistical analysis of a large representative survey of displaced households in Iraq demonstrates strong support for our theory. This impact was largest for those individuals who identified information access as important to their return decisions.
Note: This This material is based upon work supported by the U. S. Army Research Office through the Minerva Initiative under grant number W911NF1810089.
Formalized Side Switching & Rebel Group Participation in Counterinsurgency
Caroline M. Brandt
Abstract: Peace agreement provisions for military integration are theorized as mechanisms to reduce rebel groups’ vulnerability during the implementation of a peace accord. I posit that military integration serves an additional function: to enhance governments’ counterinsurgency capabilities. Governments can supplement their counterinsurgency capabilities by incorporating rebel soldiers into the national armed forces. In agreeing to participate in governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rebel groups gain confidence that government won’t renege on a deal. By incorporating rebel soldiers into government counterinsurgency offensives, peace agreements in one conflict function as war-fighting tools for another. This article presents data that is a corrective
to current data collection practices that obscure both the multiparty nature of many civil wars as well as a primary mechanism by which rebel groups switch sides in civil war.
Divide and Conquer: Exclusive Peace Agreements as a Counterinsurgency Strategy
Caroline M. Brandt
Abstract: In civil wars involving more than one rebel group, how do conflict dynamics between one government-rebel group pairing affect conflict dynamics with another? Combatting more than one rebel group strains governments capabilities as the regime must allocate resources to fight wars on multiple fronts. To improve their chances of winning, I argue that governments use exclusive peace agreements as a counterinsurgency strategy against the remaining insurgent forces. While peace agreements are often thought of as tools of peace, I argue governments may sign peace agreements as a strategy of war: by signing an agreement with one rebel group, the regime can reduce the number of fronts across which it must divide material and human resources. The regime can then redirect previously encumbered weapons, troops, and equipment into the battles against the remaining rebel forces. Dedicating additional resources to a conflict increases the likelihood of a government military victory. As such, a government is more likely to sign an exclusive peace agreement with a given rebel group when other insurgent forces are extremely threatening. To test this hypothesis, I analyze all multiparty civil wars from 1975-2010. I find that the likelihood that a government and rebel group sign an exclusive peace accord is positively correlated with the strength and number of other
active rebel groups. I then use a case study of civil war in the Southern Philippines to illustrate the mechanisms behind these correlations. In line with the theory, the evidence shows that the threat posed by other rebel groups can jump-start stalled peace talks.
Caroline M. Brandt
Abstract: Peace agreement provisions for military integration are theorized as mechanisms to reduce rebel groups’ vulnerability during the implementation of a peace accord. I posit that military integration serves an additional function: to enhance governments’ counterinsurgency capabilities. Governments can supplement their counterinsurgency capabilities by incorporating rebel soldiers into the national armed forces. In agreeing to participate in governments’ counterinsurgency campaigns, rebel groups gain confidence that government won’t renege on a deal. By incorporating rebel soldiers into government counterinsurgency offensives, peace agreements in one conflict function as war-fighting tools for another. This article presents data that is a corrective
to current data collection practices that obscure both the multiparty nature of many civil wars as well as a primary mechanism by which rebel groups switch sides in civil war.
Divide and Conquer: Exclusive Peace Agreements as a Counterinsurgency Strategy
Caroline M. Brandt
Abstract: In civil wars involving more than one rebel group, how do conflict dynamics between one government-rebel group pairing affect conflict dynamics with another? Combatting more than one rebel group strains governments capabilities as the regime must allocate resources to fight wars on multiple fronts. To improve their chances of winning, I argue that governments use exclusive peace agreements as a counterinsurgency strategy against the remaining insurgent forces. While peace agreements are often thought of as tools of peace, I argue governments may sign peace agreements as a strategy of war: by signing an agreement with one rebel group, the regime can reduce the number of fronts across which it must divide material and human resources. The regime can then redirect previously encumbered weapons, troops, and equipment into the battles against the remaining rebel forces. Dedicating additional resources to a conflict increases the likelihood of a government military victory. As such, a government is more likely to sign an exclusive peace agreement with a given rebel group when other insurgent forces are extremely threatening. To test this hypothesis, I analyze all multiparty civil wars from 1975-2010. I find that the likelihood that a government and rebel group sign an exclusive peace accord is positively correlated with the strength and number of other
active rebel groups. I then use a case study of civil war in the Southern Philippines to illustrate the mechanisms behind these correlations. In line with the theory, the evidence shows that the threat posed by other rebel groups can jump-start stalled peace talks.
Terrorist Peer Review: Which Attacks Does ISIL Accept for Publication?
Joseph M. Brown
Abstract: ISIL claims some attacks by autonomous jihadists in the West, but not all of them. This article argues that ISIL selectively claims attacks that fit tactical norms laid out in the group’s propaganda. These norms include lethality toward the victims and martyrdom for the attacker. Probit analyses of autonomous attacks in the West confirm that lethality and martyrdom increase the probability of ISIL’s official propaganda claiming a given attack. ISIL’s “peer review” process incentivizes autonomous jihadists to adopt more lethal and suicidal tactics so that their actions will gain acceptance and they will be recognized as soldiers of the caliphate.
Joseph M. Brown
Abstract: ISIL claims some attacks by autonomous jihadists in the West, but not all of them. This article argues that ISIL selectively claims attacks that fit tactical norms laid out in the group’s propaganda. These norms include lethality toward the victims and martyrdom for the attacker. Probit analyses of autonomous attacks in the West confirm that lethality and martyrdom increase the probability of ISIL’s official propaganda claiming a given attack. ISIL’s “peer review” process incentivizes autonomous jihadists to adopt more lethal and suicidal tactics so that their actions will gain acceptance and they will be recognized as soldiers of the caliphate.
- ISIL propaganda serve several functions, but we should not overlook propaganda’s role in organizing/regulating ISIL cells During the 2014-2019 period, ISIL used Dabiq/Rumiyah and Amaq to inspire and socialize jihadists
- They want copycats, and their propaganda (qualitatively) plays up lethal martyrdom attacks as the examples to emulate
- A quantitative analysis of ISIL credit claiming supports this as well, since these factors predict a higher probability of an attack’s acceptance for publication
- This enriches our existing explanations for ISIL credit-claiming, accounting for the inward-facing aspect of propaganda and helping to explain claiming decisions that outward-facing signaling logic could not
Patterns in Security Alliances between Governments and Foreign Militant Groups
Melissa Carlson, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Abstract: Although third-party governments frequently engage in intense forms of military cooperation with foreign militant groups, conventional explanations of alliance formation have exclusively focused on interactions between sovereign states. Evidence suggests that foreign militant groups and governments make costly state-like commitments, including integrating command structures and conducting joint military operations, providing partners access to their military infrastructure, and exchanging advanced weapons technologies, training, logistical support, and intelligence. This article seeks to establish a new research agenda focused on elucidating the trends in alliance commitments between governments and foreign militant groups. I argue that, although state-foreign militant alliances differ from state-state alliances in terms of formalization, they are substantively similar in terms of the types of commitments that partners make to each other, the levels to which partners institutionalize their obligations, and the costs partners bear when forming their alliance. As such, state-foreign militant alliances have similar effects on partners’ and adversaries’ behaviors as written-down agreements between states. To compare the diversity and intensity of state-state and state-foreign militant alliances, I draw from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) events data set, which
consists of all dyadic interactions between various actors from 1995-2017. I find that, on average, state and foreign militant partners engage in more intense forms of security cooperation than state-state dyads. They also more frequently form joint commands, carry out joint attacks, and provide each other military aid. Drawing from my findings, I highlight several avenues for future research.
Melissa Carlson, Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
Abstract: Although third-party governments frequently engage in intense forms of military cooperation with foreign militant groups, conventional explanations of alliance formation have exclusively focused on interactions between sovereign states. Evidence suggests that foreign militant groups and governments make costly state-like commitments, including integrating command structures and conducting joint military operations, providing partners access to their military infrastructure, and exchanging advanced weapons technologies, training, logistical support, and intelligence. This article seeks to establish a new research agenda focused on elucidating the trends in alliance commitments between governments and foreign militant groups. I argue that, although state-foreign militant alliances differ from state-state alliances in terms of formalization, they are substantively similar in terms of the types of commitments that partners make to each other, the levels to which partners institutionalize their obligations, and the costs partners bear when forming their alliance. As such, state-foreign militant alliances have similar effects on partners’ and adversaries’ behaviors as written-down agreements between states. To compare the diversity and intensity of state-state and state-foreign militant alliances, I draw from the Integrated Crisis Early Warning System (ICEWS) events data set, which
consists of all dyadic interactions between various actors from 1995-2017. I find that, on average, state and foreign militant partners engage in more intense forms of security cooperation than state-state dyads. They also more frequently form joint commands, carry out joint attacks, and provide each other military aid. Drawing from my findings, I highlight several avenues for future research.
Advising War: Limited Intervention in Conflict
Alexandra Chinchilla
Abstract: Great powers expend significant blood and treasure intervening in conflict abroad. Sometimes they intervene directly with ground combat troops, but more often rely on a local proxy to fight in exchange for support. Existing literature characterizes proxy war as either a cost-saving form of intervention or as an agency problem to be solved by aid conditionality. However, interveners often incur significant costs by relying on unfaithful and incompetent proxies, put the lives of their troops on the line by sending military advisors, and fail to use aid conditionality. I develop a formal model which relates kinds of support such as aid, arms, and military advisors to the proxy’s military capability and degree of alignment with the intervener’s preferences. Intervening states will delegate to proxies they know will be unfaithful and incompetent if intervening with ground combat troops is too costly and not intervening is not an option. When supporting unfaithful proxies, interveners seek to influence their politics, strategy, and war conduct using the threat of withdrawal or escalation to gain the proxy’s compliance. However, it cannot commit to following through on these punishments unless the proxy is very unfaithful. Hidden actions by the proxy exacerbate this problem. For unfaithful and incompetent proxies, military advisors, though costly, emerge as a key tool to manage them through monitoring and building military capacity.
Alexandra Chinchilla
Abstract: Great powers expend significant blood and treasure intervening in conflict abroad. Sometimes they intervene directly with ground combat troops, but more often rely on a local proxy to fight in exchange for support. Existing literature characterizes proxy war as either a cost-saving form of intervention or as an agency problem to be solved by aid conditionality. However, interveners often incur significant costs by relying on unfaithful and incompetent proxies, put the lives of their troops on the line by sending military advisors, and fail to use aid conditionality. I develop a formal model which relates kinds of support such as aid, arms, and military advisors to the proxy’s military capability and degree of alignment with the intervener’s preferences. Intervening states will delegate to proxies they know will be unfaithful and incompetent if intervening with ground combat troops is too costly and not intervening is not an option. When supporting unfaithful proxies, interveners seek to influence their politics, strategy, and war conduct using the threat of withdrawal or escalation to gain the proxy’s compliance. However, it cannot commit to following through on these punishments unless the proxy is very unfaithful. Hidden actions by the proxy exacerbate this problem. For unfaithful and incompetent proxies, military advisors, though costly, emerge as a key tool to manage them through monitoring and building military capacity.
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Ethnic Mobilization after Provoked and Unprovoked Repression
Ashley Fabrizio Abstract: Though frameworks for understanding government repression abound, few take into account these repressions’ origins and political context. In this paper I contribute a new and useful framework for understanding coercive government policies and actions towards members of minority ethnic groups: that every act of government repression is either “provoked” or “unprovoked” by the targeted group. To determine whether or not a particular repressive effort is provoked, I ask: Where does a particular repression originate in the government apparatus; by what deliberative, procedural, or thought process did it come about? This determination is important for understanding and anticipating the effect of repression on subsequent levels of political mobilization by the targeted individuals and their co-ethnics. Unprovoked repressive efforts are government physical, legal, or otherwise official actions against one or more members of an ethnic group that have not been directly precipitated by previous dissent by the targeted individual(s). Provoked government repressions, by contrast, have been directly precipitated by previous dissent by the targeted individual(s). Tracking the patterns of provoked/unprovoked government repression of Kurds and Kurdish political mobilization in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey from 1917-2013 shows that repressions against dissenters among the ethnic group (provoked repressions) tend to increase the likelihood and size of large-scale political mobilization while repressions that are not responses to expressed dissent (unprovoked repressions) tend to undermine the potential and size of large-scale political mobilization. Apart from this empirical finding, the paper is descriptive. Of over 1100 distinct repressive efforts by governments against Kurds, half are provoked by Kurdish dissent, but unprovoked repressions last more than three times longer on average (10.4 years) than provoked repressions (3.2 years). Governments conduct unprovoked repressions for political reasons other than specific instances of dissent, including nation-building projects, domestic and foreign pressures, and moments of regime or leadership change. For unprovoked repressions, government officials’ coercive methods span eight categories, including officially sanctioned targeting of a small number of known troublemakers, preventative operations against possible troublemakers, and policies that affect an entire ethnic group, as well as various officially unsanctioned efforts by rogue, mistaken, or malevolent government actors. When comparing unprovoked and provoked repressions we see that these categories substantively differ by government actor, type, and prevalence at different levels of national democracy and wealth. The paper also explains where the provoked/unprovoked dimension of repression overlaps with existing frameworks in the social science and international human rights spheres while specifying where it innovates. This descriptive evidence complicates the common narrative that unprovoked repression of ethnic minority groups is primarily the domain of authoritarian regimes, which have fewer institutional checks on the executive. The Kurdish case data shows high counts of unprovoked repressions in fully democratic contexts, arguably reflecting that repression stems mostly from the agency of government officials, whether they are acting on strategic considerations or more arbitrary impulse or ideology. The paper also complicates the idea that government leaders prefer to prop up their regime by targeting potential dissenters with repression while rewarding supporters and ignoring the apolitical masses. But at least with respect to disfavored ethnic minorities, governments have long been willing to turn wide swaths of their citizenry into second-class citizens via unprovoked repressions, conceiving of the population of potential dissenters broadly. I argue that the prominence of unprovoked repressions in the Kurdish case does not primarily reflect either a long-term ethnic minority strategy or a problem of low group legibility to the state. Instead, the government leaders of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey arguably repressed non-dissenting Kurds and their Kurdish populations at large precisely in order to prop up their regimes. The very act of repressing Kurds has served as a pillar in nation-building projects; quieted the electoral, security, and chauvinist anxieties of leaders’ domestic political bases; served as evidence of goodwill to leaders of bordering countries hostile to Kurds; and allowed new leaders to project strength and decisiveness. That there were at least 482 distinct unprovoked repressive efforts against Kurds in less than a century, many of which resulted in backlash Kurdish nationalist mobilization, suggests that the political utility of repressing ethnic minorities is compelling enough to be the rule, not the exception. |
Fabrizio cont'd
External Political Drivers of Unprovoked Repressions Data records 1,300 distinct (policy level) government repressive efforts against Kurds in Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey from 1917-2013. 41% were unprovoked. Governments conduct unprovoked repressions for political reasons other than specific instances of dissent
Big Picture Discussion Few repression types (unprovoked martial law) “work” to suppress mobilization in the short term, which is usually at least a publicly stated goal of government repression against expressed dissent. In the medium- and long-term, provoked employment, education, and economic denials tend to depress mobilization levels. Unprovoked violence, political exclusions, and forced relocations tend to inspire ordinary people who share same ethnicity to participate in political movements that threaten status quo. Provoked martial law and ethnic bans repressions tend to foment mobilization in the short and medium terms. Empirical findings echo findings of academic, government, NGO analysts, especially regarding backlash effects of government “heavy-handedness.” Divergent effects of unprovoked vs. provoked repressions suggests co-ethnics monitor and respond to whether government is punishing people for things they have not done. Political utility of unprovoked repressions (549 in this case, suggests the rule and not exception). Repressing Kurds has served as pillar in nation-building projects quieted electoral, security, and chauvinist anxieties of leaders’ domestic political bases served as goodwill to leaders of bordering countries hostile to Kurds and allowed new leaders to project strength and decisiveness. |
Kidnapping in Armed Conflict A Research Agenda on Hostage Taking and Recovery (as political violence)
Danielle Gilbert
Abstract: Kidnapping is a global, costly, and underexamined form of political violence. Though hostage taking has been a feature of conflict since the earliest records of war, there has been a noted increase in this form of violence since the mid-20th century, achieving worldwide prominence over the last two decades. This paper outlines a research agenda on the challenges of hostage taking and hostage recovery. Building on the growing literature on “repertoires of violence” and civilian victimization, I argue that kidnapping has been overlooked in political science and security studies, despite its centrality to intrastate and international conflict. In this paper, I address this gap by laying out a research agenda on kidnapping in armed conflict, as both a tactic of rebel and terrorist
organizations and a concern for policymakers. To do so, I first propose a typology of kidnapping by political groups, to explain the conditions under which we should expect groups to kidnap for ransom, prisoner exchange, policy demands, or publicity. Then, I connect the questions of kidnapping to significant debates and theory in the conflict literature. In doing so, I propose a set of relevant questions for future investigation, examining the causes, consequences, and responses to kidnapping. Finally, I compare kidnapping to hostage diplomacy and unlawful detentions, exploring the connections among these different forms of captivity.
Danielle Gilbert
Abstract: Kidnapping is a global, costly, and underexamined form of political violence. Though hostage taking has been a feature of conflict since the earliest records of war, there has been a noted increase in this form of violence since the mid-20th century, achieving worldwide prominence over the last two decades. This paper outlines a research agenda on the challenges of hostage taking and hostage recovery. Building on the growing literature on “repertoires of violence” and civilian victimization, I argue that kidnapping has been overlooked in political science and security studies, despite its centrality to intrastate and international conflict. In this paper, I address this gap by laying out a research agenda on kidnapping in armed conflict, as both a tactic of rebel and terrorist
organizations and a concern for policymakers. To do so, I first propose a typology of kidnapping by political groups, to explain the conditions under which we should expect groups to kidnap for ransom, prisoner exchange, policy demands, or publicity. Then, I connect the questions of kidnapping to significant debates and theory in the conflict literature. In doing so, I propose a set of relevant questions for future investigation, examining the causes, consequences, and responses to kidnapping. Finally, I compare kidnapping to hostage diplomacy and unlawful detentions, exploring the connections among these different forms of captivity.
Military Capacity Building and the International Transfer of Military Power
Marc Toby Grinberg
Abstract: The international transfer of military capability is a ubiquitous feature of world politics. Existing accounts treat military transfers as an exchange or trade between a supplier and recipient. This paper develops the argument that there is a second prominent logic through which military transfers arise: military capacity building. To increase the coercive capacity of military partners, states often provide them with arms and military training. To test whether there is evidence of military capacity building in patterns of military transfers, I leverage a feature that distinguishes capacity-building from transactional military transfers: the problem of misuse. Unlike traded arms, suppliers intend for military capacity building transfers to be used by the recipient in very particular ways. Concerns about misuse – that is, concerns that they will not be used in these ways – frequently prevent states from building the capacity of otherwise ideal military partners. Using panel data on post-World War II interstate arms transfers, I find evidence that becoming a potential military partners causes a larger increase in arms transfers when there is a low risk of misuse than when there is a high risk of misuse. These findings hold across three different operationalizations of misuse: the recipient having alternative adversaries, recipient government corruption and the recipient government’s power base resting in the military.
Marc Toby Grinberg
Abstract: The international transfer of military capability is a ubiquitous feature of world politics. Existing accounts treat military transfers as an exchange or trade between a supplier and recipient. This paper develops the argument that there is a second prominent logic through which military transfers arise: military capacity building. To increase the coercive capacity of military partners, states often provide them with arms and military training. To test whether there is evidence of military capacity building in patterns of military transfers, I leverage a feature that distinguishes capacity-building from transactional military transfers: the problem of misuse. Unlike traded arms, suppliers intend for military capacity building transfers to be used by the recipient in very particular ways. Concerns about misuse – that is, concerns that they will not be used in these ways – frequently prevent states from building the capacity of otherwise ideal military partners. Using panel data on post-World War II interstate arms transfers, I find evidence that becoming a potential military partners causes a larger increase in arms transfers when there is a low risk of misuse than when there is a high risk of misuse. These findings hold across three different operationalizations of misuse: the recipient having alternative adversaries, recipient government corruption and the recipient government’s power base resting in the military.
Can Religious Messaging Promote Social Cohesion? Experimental Evidence from Adolescents in Burkina Faso
Allison Namias Grossman, William G. Nomikos, Niloufer Siddiqui
Abstract: Can religious leaders mitigate intolerance and support for violent extremism among populations vulnerable to radicalization? If so, what type of messaging is likely to be most effective? Donors and aid organizations have spent millions of dollars to amplify the voices of local religious figures to counter violent extremism in West Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Despite this investment, we know remarkably little about whether, and which, religious messaging persuades the primary recruits of violent extremist organizations: at-risk youth in fragile settings. Through a survey experiment conducted with school-age respondents in Burkina Faso, we find little evidence that such messages|endorsed by religious authorities, appealing to Qur'anic scripture, or
invoking shared national identity{a ect reported attitudes or behaviors. Our findings cast doubt upon the efficacy of pro-tolerance, anti-extremist interventions among this demographic in the West African context.
Allison Namias Grossman, William G. Nomikos, Niloufer Siddiqui
Abstract: Can religious leaders mitigate intolerance and support for violent extremism among populations vulnerable to radicalization? If so, what type of messaging is likely to be most effective? Donors and aid organizations have spent millions of dollars to amplify the voices of local religious figures to counter violent extremism in West Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia. Despite this investment, we know remarkably little about whether, and which, religious messaging persuades the primary recruits of violent extremist organizations: at-risk youth in fragile settings. Through a survey experiment conducted with school-age respondents in Burkina Faso, we find little evidence that such messages|endorsed by religious authorities, appealing to Qur'anic scripture, or
invoking shared national identity{a ect reported attitudes or behaviors. Our findings cast doubt upon the efficacy of pro-tolerance, anti-extremist interventions among this demographic in the West African context.
Rebel or Nuisance? Public Perception of Armed Groups in India
Kolby Hanson
Abstract: Within the borders of most states, there are multiple armed groups mobilized to protect political interest blocs like ethnic groups, regions, or parties. Yet while some of these groups are treated as serious threats, others are ignored or accepted by government forces (Staniland, 2017). What role does public opinion play in this process, and when does the domestic public nd armed groups threatening? Drawing on work on broader ethnic politics, I argue that elite-led symbolic politics drives individuals' perception of the threat that a given movement poses. Even powerful and culturally distant armed groups may be seen as a mere nuisance in the absence of salient political leadership, and even tiny armed groups can be symbolically threatening. I examine these issues through a nationwide survey in India, which is home to dozens of anti-state groups. I measure a variety of civilian perceptions of seven major armed movements, looking at how support for counterinsurgency correlate with features of the groups and individuals. I find that both the size of armed movements and their ethnoreligious identities are poor predictors of civilian views . Instead, civilians perceptions appear to be shaped by broader political identities supporters of Modi's BJP are much more likely to support counterinsurgency, even when they do not share ethnic or religious identities with the BJP.
Kolby Hanson
Abstract: Within the borders of most states, there are multiple armed groups mobilized to protect political interest blocs like ethnic groups, regions, or parties. Yet while some of these groups are treated as serious threats, others are ignored or accepted by government forces (Staniland, 2017). What role does public opinion play in this process, and when does the domestic public nd armed groups threatening? Drawing on work on broader ethnic politics, I argue that elite-led symbolic politics drives individuals' perception of the threat that a given movement poses. Even powerful and culturally distant armed groups may be seen as a mere nuisance in the absence of salient political leadership, and even tiny armed groups can be symbolically threatening. I examine these issues through a nationwide survey in India, which is home to dozens of anti-state groups. I measure a variety of civilian perceptions of seven major armed movements, looking at how support for counterinsurgency correlate with features of the groups and individuals. I find that both the size of armed movements and their ethnoreligious identities are poor predictors of civilian views . Instead, civilians perceptions appear to be shaped by broader political identities supporters of Modi's BJP are much more likely to support counterinsurgency, even when they do not share ethnic or religious identities with the BJP.
Contagious Conflicts and Militant Mobilization
Lindsay J. Hundley, Stanford University
Iris Malone, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University ([email protected])
Abstract: Do civil wars in neighboring countries increase the risk of civil conflict at home? Despite some evidence of contagion effects from the Arab Spring and the Color Revolutions, scholars still disagree over how and even whether militant violence spreads. We argue this debate exists, in part, because of a lack of fine-grained data about lower-level militant campaigns, which had the potential to escalate into national revolutions. This paper develops a new theory to explain both when and why political uprisings spillover by disaggregating along conflict intensity. We argue that contagion effects increase the likelihood that armed groups mobilize to challenge the state, but state reactions minimize the escalation of these conflicts. The paper derives a series of observable predictions about under what conditions contagion effects are most likely to emerge and test these hypotheses on an unprecedented, cross-national dataset of approximately 1,200 militant campaigns between 1970-2012.
Lindsay J. Hundley, Stanford University
Iris Malone, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University ([email protected])
Abstract: Do civil wars in neighboring countries increase the risk of civil conflict at home? Despite some evidence of contagion effects from the Arab Spring and the Color Revolutions, scholars still disagree over how and even whether militant violence spreads. We argue this debate exists, in part, because of a lack of fine-grained data about lower-level militant campaigns, which had the potential to escalate into national revolutions. This paper develops a new theory to explain both when and why political uprisings spillover by disaggregating along conflict intensity. We argue that contagion effects increase the likelihood that armed groups mobilize to challenge the state, but state reactions minimize the escalation of these conflicts. The paper derives a series of observable predictions about under what conditions contagion effects are most likely to emerge and test these hypotheses on an unprecedented, cross-national dataset of approximately 1,200 militant campaigns between 1970-2012.
Female Participation in Militant Organizations in Islamic State Affiliates in Southeast Asia
Authors: Amira Jadoon, Julie Loeden, Charmaine Willis and Nakissa Jahanbani
Abstract: Prior research on female participation in militant organizations explores organizational and individual factors that influence women's recruitment, and the roles women fulfill. However, most research focuses either on transnational organizations or local militant groups. Within this study, we explore how linkages with transnational groups shape female participation within their overseas affiliate organizations. We employ an original dataset of female militants arrested or killed between 2014 and 2019 in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, accounting for organizational affiliation. Overall, we find that female participation in militant groups increased between 2015 and 2017, with most of the increase associated with the Islamic State. While most women with an Islamic State association assumed non-combat roles, more than a third assumed combatant roles, indicating the influence of country-level and regional
dynamics. Based on our data, female combatants with an Islamic State association served exclusively as either suicide attackers or conducted bombings, diverging from the varied roles assumed by women combatants in other groups in the region. Overall, our findings highlight how the nature of transnational organizations can combine with the local dynamics of their affiliate groups to produce unique trends in the local female militant landscape.
Findings
Authors: Amira Jadoon, Julie Loeden, Charmaine Willis and Nakissa Jahanbani
Abstract: Prior research on female participation in militant organizations explores organizational and individual factors that influence women's recruitment, and the roles women fulfill. However, most research focuses either on transnational organizations or local militant groups. Within this study, we explore how linkages with transnational groups shape female participation within their overseas affiliate organizations. We employ an original dataset of female militants arrested or killed between 2014 and 2019 in the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia, accounting for organizational affiliation. Overall, we find that female participation in militant groups increased between 2015 and 2017, with most of the increase associated with the Islamic State. While most women with an Islamic State association assumed non-combat roles, more than a third assumed combatant roles, indicating the influence of country-level and regional
dynamics. Based on our data, female combatants with an Islamic State association served exclusively as either suicide attackers or conducted bombings, diverging from the varied roles assumed by women combatants in other groups in the region. Overall, our findings highlight how the nature of transnational organizations can combine with the local dynamics of their affiliate groups to produce unique trends in the local female militant landscape.
Findings
- Overall levels of female participants: We find that that the number of women associated with militant groups who were arrested or killed in the three countries steadily increased between 2015 and 2017, amounting to a total of 115 women across the years (2015-2019). The majority of these (60-80%) consisted of IS-linked women.
- Roles:
- Regionally, IS-linked women assumed a narrower variety of roles compared to the non-IS linked female militants per our dataset
- For women specifically associated with the Islamic State, even though the majority of them assumed non-combatant roles, about 33% of them participated in combatant roles, which deviates considerably from the largely non-combatant roles adopted by women affiliated with IS-Central. Collectively, this suggests that in addition to transnational dynamics, local factors exert a notable influence on the specific role composition of women participants within Islamic State's global affiliates.
- Regionally, IS-linked women assumed a narrower variety of roles compared to the non-IS linked female militants per our dataset
- Tactics: When employing women as combatants, we find that IS-linked women are primarily used as suicide attackers whereas non-IS women are used as fighters.
- Country-level variation:
- The number of female militants in the Philippines is almost double that in Indonesia and Malaysia combined.
- In Malaysia, female militants are more likely to be linked to Islamic State, albeit mostly as noncombatants. In Indonesia, women associated with local groups are more likely to participate as combatants.
Security Assistance and Military Behavior in Africa
Renanah Miles Joyce
Abstract: Does security assistance restrain developing militaries at home or does it empower them to commit human rights abuses and conduct coups by building up their material capacity? The United States, like other liberal powers, uses security assistance (i.e., arms and training) not only to build capacity but also to impart norms of restraint in developing militaries. In this paper, I argue that norm violations can occur not because security assistance fails to impart norms, but because it does not impart them quickly enough relative to increases in military capacity. Militaries with enhanced capabilities from security assistance may be more likely to intervene politically or abuse human rights, at least in the short run. To test this argument, I use an original dataset on
US security assistance, military involvement in politics, and human rights abuses in Africa between 1999-2010. The dataset provides 24 indicators of military behavior across political, legal, economic, and societal institutions. The cross-national analyses use models that account for “who gets assistance,” because underlying state fragility may drive allocation of training as well as norm-violating behavior. This study has implications for theories of security assistance and civil-military relations, as well as US foreign policy in weak and transitional democracies.
Renanah Miles Joyce
Abstract: Does security assistance restrain developing militaries at home or does it empower them to commit human rights abuses and conduct coups by building up their material capacity? The United States, like other liberal powers, uses security assistance (i.e., arms and training) not only to build capacity but also to impart norms of restraint in developing militaries. In this paper, I argue that norm violations can occur not because security assistance fails to impart norms, but because it does not impart them quickly enough relative to increases in military capacity. Militaries with enhanced capabilities from security assistance may be more likely to intervene politically or abuse human rights, at least in the short run. To test this argument, I use an original dataset on
US security assistance, military involvement in politics, and human rights abuses in Africa between 1999-2010. The dataset provides 24 indicators of military behavior across political, legal, economic, and societal institutions. The cross-national analyses use models that account for “who gets assistance,” because underlying state fragility may drive allocation of training as well as norm-violating behavior. This study has implications for theories of security assistance and civil-military relations, as well as US foreign policy in weak and transitional democracies.
Who Fakes Support for the Military? Results from Two Survey Experiments on Preference Falsification
Koehler, Kevin; Leiden University, Institute of Political Science
Grewal, Sharan; College of William & Mary
Albrecht, Holger; The University of Alabama System, Department of Political Science
Abstract: Surveys around the world report high levels of support for the military. Given the sensitive nature of the issue, we suspect that such figures are
at least partly driven by preference falsification. We explore this possibility through list experiments in two nationally representative surveys in Tunisia, a hard case for finding such bias given its level of freedom and relatively marginal role of the military in politics. We find that preference falsification is substantial, with respondents overstating their support for the military by 40 to 50 percentage points. Moreover, preference falsification results from partisan bias, rather than random measurement error with supporters governing parties overreporting their support for the military to a significantly higher degree than opposition supporters.
Koehler, Kevin; Leiden University, Institute of Political Science
Grewal, Sharan; College of William & Mary
Albrecht, Holger; The University of Alabama System, Department of Political Science
Abstract: Surveys around the world report high levels of support for the military. Given the sensitive nature of the issue, we suspect that such figures are
at least partly driven by preference falsification. We explore this possibility through list experiments in two nationally representative surveys in Tunisia, a hard case for finding such bias given its level of freedom and relatively marginal role of the military in politics. We find that preference falsification is substantial, with respondents overstating their support for the military by 40 to 50 percentage points. Moreover, preference falsification results from partisan bias, rather than random measurement error with supporters governing parties overreporting their support for the military to a significantly higher degree than opposition supporters.
Repression, Rivalry and The Escalation of Terrorist Campaigns to Civil Wars
Mustafa Kirisci https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mustafa_Kirisci2/research
The majority of terrorist campaigns are usually short-lived and do not escalate to an armed insurgency. Research on the link between terrorism and civil wars focuses primarily on when and why violent groups use terrorism or the effect of using terrorism by rebels on dynamics of civil wars. Yet it remains unclear why the terrorist campaigns of some violent non-state groups transition into an armed insurgency, but other violent groups’ terror campaigns do not. For example, why Tupamaros’s terror campaign in Uruguay in the late 1960s, and Red Brigade’s terror campaign in Italy in 1970s and 1980s didn’t lead to a civil war in these countries, but PKK managed to turn its terror campaign starting in 1984 in Turkey into a persistent insurgency.
This paper contends that the way the target state uses repression against group pursuing a terrorist campaign might significantly affect the ability of the violent group in escalating their campaign to an insurgency. More specifically, we argue that the state’s use of repression in very high and very low levels against the violent group engaging in a terror campaign will reduce the probability of transition of the group’s terror campaign into an insurgency. Repression in moderate levels against the violent group, however, will increase the group’s chances of escalating its terror campaign to an insurgency. Very high levels of repression by state against the group may help the group to justify its campaign of terrorist violence, but it will also significantly undermine the group’s mobilization capacity, thereby reducing its ability to escalate its campaign to a next phase of the conflict. State repression in low levels against the group will delegitimize the group’s use of terrorism and diminish the ability of the group in gaining sufficient public support from the population for further mobilization and the escalation of the terror campaign to an armed insurgency. Beyond the effect of state repression, we also argue that the group’s chance of receiving external support might also have a critical impact on the likelihood that the terror campaign will transition into an insurgency. Given that, we put forward an argument that the group’s chance of escalating its terror campaign to an insurgency will increase as the target state has more rivals in international politics because rivals might act as sponsors of the group’s terror campaign by providing support for the group. The findings revealed by our large-N empirical analysis supported by the illustrative case stories contribute to the existing understanding of the linkage between terrorism and civil wars, and have important implications for policymakers to consider in developing effective counterterrorism policies that can mitigate terrorist violence before it escalates to a civil war.
Mustafa Kirisci https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Mustafa_Kirisci2/research
The majority of terrorist campaigns are usually short-lived and do not escalate to an armed insurgency. Research on the link between terrorism and civil wars focuses primarily on when and why violent groups use terrorism or the effect of using terrorism by rebels on dynamics of civil wars. Yet it remains unclear why the terrorist campaigns of some violent non-state groups transition into an armed insurgency, but other violent groups’ terror campaigns do not. For example, why Tupamaros’s terror campaign in Uruguay in the late 1960s, and Red Brigade’s terror campaign in Italy in 1970s and 1980s didn’t lead to a civil war in these countries, but PKK managed to turn its terror campaign starting in 1984 in Turkey into a persistent insurgency.
This paper contends that the way the target state uses repression against group pursuing a terrorist campaign might significantly affect the ability of the violent group in escalating their campaign to an insurgency. More specifically, we argue that the state’s use of repression in very high and very low levels against the violent group engaging in a terror campaign will reduce the probability of transition of the group’s terror campaign into an insurgency. Repression in moderate levels against the violent group, however, will increase the group’s chances of escalating its terror campaign to an insurgency. Very high levels of repression by state against the group may help the group to justify its campaign of terrorist violence, but it will also significantly undermine the group’s mobilization capacity, thereby reducing its ability to escalate its campaign to a next phase of the conflict. State repression in low levels against the group will delegitimize the group’s use of terrorism and diminish the ability of the group in gaining sufficient public support from the population for further mobilization and the escalation of the terror campaign to an armed insurgency. Beyond the effect of state repression, we also argue that the group’s chance of receiving external support might also have a critical impact on the likelihood that the terror campaign will transition into an insurgency. Given that, we put forward an argument that the group’s chance of escalating its terror campaign to an insurgency will increase as the target state has more rivals in international politics because rivals might act as sponsors of the group’s terror campaign by providing support for the group. The findings revealed by our large-N empirical analysis supported by the illustrative case stories contribute to the existing understanding of the linkage between terrorism and civil wars, and have important implications for policymakers to consider in developing effective counterterrorism policies that can mitigate terrorist violence before it escalates to a civil war.
Oil Discovery, Oil Production, and Coups d’État
Hans-Inge Langø, Curtis M. Bell, Scott Wolford
Abstract: How does the discovery and production of oil affect the risks of coups d’état? We analyze a model of bargaining between government and military in which oil rents (a) increase the value of capturing the state but also (b) allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and/or appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth is realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before power shifts decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are exceptionally likely to fail. We uncover these
relationships in an analysis of coup attempts and outcomes, oil production, and oil discovery in a global sample of states from 1980-2010.
Hans-Inge Langø, Curtis M. Bell, Scott Wolford
Abstract: How does the discovery and production of oil affect the risks of coups d’état? We analyze a model of bargaining between government and military in which oil rents (a) increase the value of capturing the state but also (b) allow leaders to coup-proof their governments and/or appease potential plotters. These mechanisms offset each other once oil wealth is realized; incentives to topple the government are countered by the government’s capacity to thwart or discourage coups. But when oil is newly discovered and rents have not yet been realized, plotters may launch a coup before power shifts decisively against them. Coup attempts are uniquely likely in such windows of opportunity, but those same coup attempts are exceptionally likely to fail. We uncover these
relationships in an analysis of coup attempts and outcomes, oil production, and oil discovery in a global sample of states from 1980-2010.
Negative Economic Shocks and Militant Formation
Iris Malone, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
Conventional wisdom holds negative economic shocks increase the likelihood of militant campaigns and civil conflict, but existing evidence is largely mixed. This note shows these results arise for two reasons. First, empirical tests conflate when militant violence begins and when this violence intensifies to the point of civil war. Second, tests often omit information about militant campaigns that never intensify into civil conflicts. I argue negative economic shocks increase the probability campaigns form, but their effects tend to dissipate before campaigns evolve into civil war. Using original data on 944 militant campaigns between 1970 and 2007, I estimate the effect of export commodity price shocks on the emergence and evolution of militant campaigns. The results demonstrate shocks affect the initial phase of militant campaigns, but have little to no effect on their later transition to civil conflict. Disaggregating campaign stages can advance research on the causes of civil conflict.
Iris Malone, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University
Conventional wisdom holds negative economic shocks increase the likelihood of militant campaigns and civil conflict, but existing evidence is largely mixed. This note shows these results arise for two reasons. First, empirical tests conflate when militant violence begins and when this violence intensifies to the point of civil war. Second, tests often omit information about militant campaigns that never intensify into civil conflicts. I argue negative economic shocks increase the probability campaigns form, but their effects tend to dissipate before campaigns evolve into civil war. Using original data on 944 militant campaigns between 1970 and 2007, I estimate the effect of export commodity price shocks on the emergence and evolution of militant campaigns. The results demonstrate shocks affect the initial phase of militant campaigns, but have little to no effect on their later transition to civil conflict. Disaggregating campaign stages can advance research on the causes of civil conflict.
Two Sides of the Same Coin? Examining Rebel Governance and Terrorism
Sara M. T. Polo, Liana Eustacia Reyes, Megan A. Stewart
Abstract: Extant research suggests that rebels who govern should be more interested in legitimacy, a factor negatively associated with the use of terrorism. Yet, nearly 55% of rebels who engage in governance also engage in indiscriminate violence within the same con ict year. What explains
the use of these seemingly orthogonal strategies? We argue that revolutionary rebels are more likely to simultaneously engage in strategies of governance and terrorism than non revolutionary rebels. Because governance by revolutionary rebels is a political project in tended to transform political and social orders, rebels are willing to expend the necessary resources to sustain their political project even at the detriment of their military capabilities. As a result, we may be more likely to observe such groups use the “weapon of the weak” to pressure states into concessions, while preserving important political changes achieved in
areas rebel’s governed. Moreover, we expect this e ect to be largely driven by center-seeking revolutionary rebels. For center-seeking revolutionaries – that is, revolutionaries who seek control of the central government – the requirements for military victory make these organizations particularly likely to rely upon indiscriminate violence alongside governance, in comparison to revolutionary secessionist movements. We examine our argument quantitatively with data on rebel social service provision and terrorist tactics in civil con icts from 1970-2003.
Sara M. T. Polo, Liana Eustacia Reyes, Megan A. Stewart
Abstract: Extant research suggests that rebels who govern should be more interested in legitimacy, a factor negatively associated with the use of terrorism. Yet, nearly 55% of rebels who engage in governance also engage in indiscriminate violence within the same con ict year. What explains
the use of these seemingly orthogonal strategies? We argue that revolutionary rebels are more likely to simultaneously engage in strategies of governance and terrorism than non revolutionary rebels. Because governance by revolutionary rebels is a political project in tended to transform political and social orders, rebels are willing to expend the necessary resources to sustain their political project even at the detriment of their military capabilities. As a result, we may be more likely to observe such groups use the “weapon of the weak” to pressure states into concessions, while preserving important political changes achieved in
areas rebel’s governed. Moreover, we expect this e ect to be largely driven by center-seeking revolutionary rebels. For center-seeking revolutionaries – that is, revolutionaries who seek control of the central government – the requirements for military victory make these organizations particularly likely to rely upon indiscriminate violence alongside governance, in comparison to revolutionary secessionist movements. We examine our argument quantitatively with data on rebel social service provision and terrorist tactics in civil con icts from 1970-2003.
“Judging the Uncertainty: Regime Type, Judicial Institutional Strength, and Coups d’état”
Rebecca E. Schiel
Abstract: Recent coup attempts in democracies including Thailand (2006), Guinea Bissau (2008), Honduras (2009), Lesotho (2014), and Burundi (2015), question whether democracies are as safe from coups as once thought. These coup attempts are can have serious repercussions, underscoring the need to understand what predisposes some democracies to coup risk. I assert that judicial institutional weakness increases uncertainty in elite transactions denying elites
reliable and repeatable information about the menu of options available, and the likely actions, of others. Therefore, judicial institutional weakness, in conjunction with a lack of mechanisms to manage elite defections, predisposes some democracies to coup risk. Examining a global sample
of countries from 1950-2012, data concerning judicial institutions illustrates this mechanism showing the greatest coup proclivity in democratic regimes with weak judicial institutions. Results of this study point to variation in judicial institutions within democracies and begin to reconcile earlier findings regarding coup risk in democracies.
Rebecca E. Schiel
Abstract: Recent coup attempts in democracies including Thailand (2006), Guinea Bissau (2008), Honduras (2009), Lesotho (2014), and Burundi (2015), question whether democracies are as safe from coups as once thought. These coup attempts are can have serious repercussions, underscoring the need to understand what predisposes some democracies to coup risk. I assert that judicial institutional weakness increases uncertainty in elite transactions denying elites
reliable and repeatable information about the menu of options available, and the likely actions, of others. Therefore, judicial institutional weakness, in conjunction with a lack of mechanisms to manage elite defections, predisposes some democracies to coup risk. Examining a global sample
of countries from 1950-2012, data concerning judicial institutions illustrates this mechanism showing the greatest coup proclivity in democratic regimes with weak judicial institutions. Results of this study point to variation in judicial institutions within democracies and begin to reconcile earlier findings regarding coup risk in democracies.
Political Legitimacy and Worldwide Terrorist Attacks, 1970-2017
Anina Schwarzenbach and Gary LaFree
Abstract: The classic work by Max Weber argued for the impact of political legitimacy on reducing conflict and violence within states. Based on Weber and more recent theorists we argue that governments whose legitimacy is undermined are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Using data on worldwide terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and measures of good governance from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V Dem), we find considerable (but not total) support for the impact of legitimacy on terrorist attacks. We perform fixed-effects negative binomial regressions of domestic terrorist attacks covering 131 countries from 1970-2017 to test the impact of four political legitimacy measures: accountability, efficiency, procedural and distributive fairness. Controlling for common economic, political and demographic measures, we find that from all legitimacy measures, accountability has the most robust influence: rates of domestic terrorist attacks are highest when governments are transitioning from highly unaccountable to highly accountable systems.
Moreover, our results suggest that political legitimacy is a multi-dimensional concept and its components have varying effects on domestic terrorist attacks. We discuss the implications for theory, policy and future research
Anina Schwarzenbach and Gary LaFree
Abstract: The classic work by Max Weber argued for the impact of political legitimacy on reducing conflict and violence within states. Based on Weber and more recent theorists we argue that governments whose legitimacy is undermined are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Using data on worldwide terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and measures of good governance from the Varieties of Democracy Project (V Dem), we find considerable (but not total) support for the impact of legitimacy on terrorist attacks. We perform fixed-effects negative binomial regressions of domestic terrorist attacks covering 131 countries from 1970-2017 to test the impact of four political legitimacy measures: accountability, efficiency, procedural and distributive fairness. Controlling for common economic, political and demographic measures, we find that from all legitimacy measures, accountability has the most robust influence: rates of domestic terrorist attacks are highest when governments are transitioning from highly unaccountable to highly accountable systems.
Moreover, our results suggest that political legitimacy is a multi-dimensional concept and its components have varying effects on domestic terrorist attacks. We discuss the implications for theory, policy and future research
USG/IO Documents and Resources
Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR)
https://www.state.gov/reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework-for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected-areas-2018/
In early 2018, Department of State, USAID, and Department of Defense approved the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a new framework to best leverage our diplomatic engagement, defense, and foreign assistance to stabilize conflict-affected areas. The SAR captures lessons learned from previous stabilization contexts and details a framework to optimize interagency efforts.
PKSOI Guides, Handbooks and Case Studies
http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/resources/pksoi-publications/guides-handbooks-and-case-studies/
Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR)
https://www.state.gov/reports/stabilization-assistance-review-a-framework-for-maximizing-the-effectiveness-of-u-s-government-efforts-to-stabilize-conflict-affected-areas-2018/
In early 2018, Department of State, USAID, and Department of Defense approved the Stabilization Assistance Review (SAR) as a new framework to best leverage our diplomatic engagement, defense, and foreign assistance to stabilize conflict-affected areas. The SAR captures lessons learned from previous stabilization contexts and details a framework to optimize interagency efforts.
PKSOI Guides, Handbooks and Case Studies
http://pksoi.armywarcollege.edu/index.cfm/resources/pksoi-publications/guides-handbooks-and-case-studies/
