IGAD Security Sector Program:
Development of a Regional Strategy To Prevent,
Counter, and Respond to Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) in the IGAD Region
PROJECT EVENT COVERAGE
February 2022 https://igad.int/divisions/peace-and-security/2952-igad-security-chiefs-discuss-collaborative-approach-to-combating-the-threat-of-improvised-explosive-devices March 2022 https://www.citizen.digital/news/kenya-hosts-conference-on-countering-ieds-n295566 RECENT/UPDATED RESOURCES BASIC CHEMISTRY OF EXPLOSIVES AND HAZARDS OF HOME-MADE EXPLOSIVES AND CHEMICAL PRECURSORS HANDBOOK Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/GICHD-resources/rec-documents/IEDD_Handbook_Chapter_5.pdf The widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has been documented extensively by the mine action sector over the last decade. Together with this trend is the use of home-made explosives (HMEs). Although not all IEDs include an HME component, the frequency of their use and the specific operational challenges related to HMEs and their chemical precursors, have highlighted the need to document good practice related to this lesser-known category of explosives. An examination of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of explosive compositions found within Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Precursor-chemicals_IEDs-v5.pdf In this latest AOAV report, Brigadier Gareth Collett analyses the global history, use and regulation of precursor chemicals in the manufacture of Home Made Explosive (HME) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Examining case studies from the IRA’s use of precursor chemicals in Northern Ireland; the commercialisation of chemical fertilisers in Afghanistan and Pakistan; stockpiling and dumping precursor chemicals in Beirut; and the Islamic State’s use of precursor chemicals in HME and IEDs, this report offers recommendations on a global strategy of regulation around precursor chemicals to reduce the global manufacture of IEDs. The War In Afghanistan Was A Generational Experiment On The Effects Of Roadside Bombs In 20 years of fighting ending last week, 2,452 American service members died in combat in Afghanistan. But deaths alone don’t reflect the true cost of a generation of warfare. RESOURCES
United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model and Self-Assessment Tool
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Lexicon
Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) certification resources
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ACADEMIC RESOURCES
Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab’s Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa
Katharine Petrich
October 2019 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873?af=R&journalCode=uter20&journalCode=uter20
Abstract: Contrary to historical terrorism scholarship, terrorist groups can strategically diversify into a variety of criminal activities without losing their core ideology or support among the civilian population. This pattern is demonstrated by the evolutionary arc of al-Shabaab, which grew from a small subset of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union to the most violent political actor in the Horn of Africa, able to conduct terrorist attacks as far afield as Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab has been highly successful in creating a narrative of truth and justice provision while simultaneously exploiting the Somali population and engaging in criminal activity. For the group, criminal activity and crime networks serve two primary purposes: as a funding mechanism and as an avenue for recruitment. Using ethnographic fieldwork and process tracing, I find that the group’s criminal activities throughout the Horn of Africa have made the group significantly more resilient to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns, extending both its lifespan and operational capability.
How Do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings? The Case of Al-Shabaab
Mohammed Ibrahim Shire
17 Jun 2020 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021
Abstract: Targeted killing is a cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy, and tactical mistakes made by militant groups are endemic in terrorism. Yet, how do they affect a militant group’s suicide bomber deployment? Since joining Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has carried out various types of suicide attacks on different targets. Using a uniquely constructed dataset, I introduce two typologies of suicide bomber detonation profiles – single and multiple – and explore the strategic purposes these have served for the group during multiphasic stages following targeted killings against the group’s leadership and targeting errors committed by Al-Shabaab. The findings reveal that targeted killing has the opposite effect of disrupting suicide attacks, instead, leading to a rapid proliferation of unsophisticated single suicide attacks against civilian and military targets to maintain the perception of the group’s potency. Thus, I argue that targeting errors made by Al-Shabaab have a more serious detrimental effect on its deployment of suicide attacks than any counter-terrorism measure.
BOOKS
Cows, Charcoal, and Cocaine: Al-Shabaab’s Criminal Activities in the Horn of Africa
Katharine Petrich
October 2019 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2019.1678873?af=R&journalCode=uter20&journalCode=uter20
Abstract: Contrary to historical terrorism scholarship, terrorist groups can strategically diversify into a variety of criminal activities without losing their core ideology or support among the civilian population. This pattern is demonstrated by the evolutionary arc of al-Shabaab, which grew from a small subset of Somalia’s Islamic Courts Union to the most violent political actor in the Horn of Africa, able to conduct terrorist attacks as far afield as Kenya, Djibouti, and Ethiopia. Al-Shabaab has been highly successful in creating a narrative of truth and justice provision while simultaneously exploiting the Somali population and engaging in criminal activity. For the group, criminal activity and crime networks serve two primary purposes: as a funding mechanism and as an avenue for recruitment. Using ethnographic fieldwork and process tracing, I find that the group’s criminal activities throughout the Horn of Africa have made the group significantly more resilient to counterterrorism and counterinsurgency campaigns, extending both its lifespan and operational capability.
How Do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings? The Case of Al-Shabaab
Mohammed Ibrahim Shire
17 Jun 2020 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021
Abstract: Targeted killing is a cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy, and tactical mistakes made by militant groups are endemic in terrorism. Yet, how do they affect a militant group’s suicide bomber deployment? Since joining Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has carried out various types of suicide attacks on different targets. Using a uniquely constructed dataset, I introduce two typologies of suicide bomber detonation profiles – single and multiple – and explore the strategic purposes these have served for the group during multiphasic stages following targeted killings against the group’s leadership and targeting errors committed by Al-Shabaab. The findings reveal that targeted killing has the opposite effect of disrupting suicide attacks, instead, leading to a rapid proliferation of unsophisticated single suicide attacks against civilian and military targets to maintain the perception of the group’s potency. Thus, I argue that targeting errors made by Al-Shabaab have a more serious detrimental effect on its deployment of suicide attacks than any counter-terrorism measure.
BOOKS