Tracking and Disrupting the Illicit Antiquities Trade with Open Source Data
by Matthew Sargent, James V. Marrone, Alexandra Evans, Bilyana Lilly, Erik Nemeth, Stephen Dalzell
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2706.html?fbclid=IwAR3mM3hnNajR0uTD4bw4edZ-IsIm6WuyIQn-N3BXI7aRJahkuC8JZ568SKc
The illicit antiquities market has become an area of concern for policymakers. It is fueled by a well-documented rise in looting at archaeological sites and a fear that the proceeds of such looting may be financing terrorism or rogue states. Efforts to craft effective policy responses are hindered by the lack of data and evidence on two fronts: the size of the market and the network structure of participants. In lieu of reliable evidence on these two fronts, the conversation has been dominated by speculation and hypotheses and has generated some widely accepted theories of how the illicit antiquities market operates.
In this report, the authors compile evidence from numerous open sources to outline the major policy-relevant characteristics of that market and to propose the way forward for developing policies intended to disrupt illicit networks. The approach uses multiple methods and data sources, with the understanding that no single piece of evidence can provide a complete picture of the market and that only by cross-referencing and triangulating among various sources can salient market characteristics be illuminated.
Key Findings
Recommendations
by Matthew Sargent, James V. Marrone, Alexandra Evans, Bilyana Lilly, Erik Nemeth, Stephen Dalzell
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2706.html?fbclid=IwAR3mM3hnNajR0uTD4bw4edZ-IsIm6WuyIQn-N3BXI7aRJahkuC8JZ568SKc
The illicit antiquities market has become an area of concern for policymakers. It is fueled by a well-documented rise in looting at archaeological sites and a fear that the proceeds of such looting may be financing terrorism or rogue states. Efforts to craft effective policy responses are hindered by the lack of data and evidence on two fronts: the size of the market and the network structure of participants. In lieu of reliable evidence on these two fronts, the conversation has been dominated by speculation and hypotheses and has generated some widely accepted theories of how the illicit antiquities market operates.
In this report, the authors compile evidence from numerous open sources to outline the major policy-relevant characteristics of that market and to propose the way forward for developing policies intended to disrupt illicit networks. The approach uses multiple methods and data sources, with the understanding that no single piece of evidence can provide a complete picture of the market and that only by cross-referencing and triangulating among various sources can salient market characteristics be illuminated.
Key Findings
- The market size is smaller than often reported.
- Market structure varies widely, but it often appears ad hoc and opportunistic.
- The West is not the only end market for looted antiquities.
- Technology used in the looted antiquities trade is mostly unsophisticated.
Recommendations
- Policy responses should address a decentralized network that relies heavily on trust and communications between buyers and sellers who do not have an ongoing personal relationship.
- Increase fear of law enforcement by sharing stories that highlight the risks of illicit trades or accounts of sting operations.
- Increase skepticism about fakes and replicas by highlighting the lack of specialists in the network and noting recent examples of doubt about the authenticity of high-profile antiquities.
- Undermine trust by increasing the perceived threat of surveillance on messaging and transaction platforms.
- The methods demonstrated in this report should be applied and validated in other research contexts.
