C-EEI Research Resources
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STRATEGIC GUIDANCE
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Counter-IED Capability Maturity Model and Self-Assessment Tool
UNMAS Gender & Diversity Strategyhttps://www.mineaction.org/sites/default/files/unmas_portfolio_unops_psc_gender_diversity_strategy.pdf United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) NATO ECOWAS The ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials was adopted on 14 June 2006 and entered into force on 29 September 2009. The ECOWAS Convention is a legally binding instrument regulating the manufacture, trade, possession, and disposal of small arms and light weapons, firearms, ammunition, but also landmines, bombs, and missile systems. African Union
TRAINING RESOURCES
International Peace Support Training Center (IPSTC) Kenya Humanitarian Peace Support School – c-IED wing UNMAS Mobile Training Team Uganda 2020 The UNMAS IED Threat Mitigation Advisory Team established a mobile training team in Entebbe, Uganda which will support regional training centers and bilateral partners to conduct pre-deployment training for United Nations troop contributing countries consistent with United Nations standards. Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI) certification resources L'Institut de Formation aux Opérations de Paix est heureux de s’associer avec le E-Apprentissage Pour Les Forces de Maintien de La Paix En Niger (ELPN) pour proposer gratuitement un e-apprentissage dans le domaine du maintien de la paix. Le POTI propose des cours en anglais, en français, et espagnol. Le personnel suivant l’e-apprentissage pour les forces de maintien de l’ordre depuis le Niger peuvent télécharger tous les supports de cours, étudier leurs cours hors ligne, passer chaque Quiz de fin de leçon avec score, et passer l’Examen de fin de cours en ligne quand ils sont prêts.
Center for EOD Excellence-Tunisia (TC2E) Provides EOD/C-EEI training to African partners at the NATO and US standard. NATO Centre of Excellence (Spain) The Counter Improvised Explosive Devices Centre of Excellence (C-IED COE) is an International Military Organization, multinationally manned and funded by contributions from 12 nations. Provides limited training for non-NATO partners and a good database. RECENT/UPDATED RESOURCES
BASIC CHEMISTRY OF EXPLOSIVES AND HAZARDS OF HOME-MADE EXPLOSIVES AND CHEMICAL PRECURSORS HANDBOOK Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining https://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/GICHD-resources/rec-documents/IEDD_Handbook_Chapter_5.pdf The widespread use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) has been documented extensively by the mine action sector over the last decade. Together with this trend is the use of home-made explosives (HMEs). Although not all IEDs include an HME component, the frequency of their use and the specific operational challenges related to HMEs and their chemical precursors, have highlighted the need to document good practice related to this lesser-known category of explosives. An examination of the precursor chemicals used in the manufacture of explosive compositions found within Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) https://aoav.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/08/Precursor-chemicals_IEDs-v5.pdf In this latest AOAV report, Brigadier Gareth Collett analyses the global history, use and regulation of precursor chemicals in the manufacture of Home Made Explosive (HME) and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Examining case studies from the IRA’s use of precursor chemicals in Northern Ireland; the commercialisation of chemical fertilisers in Afghanistan and Pakistan; stockpiling and dumping precursor chemicals in Beirut; and the Islamic State’s use of precursor chemicals in HME and IEDs, this report offers recommendations on a global strategy of regulation around precursor chemicals to reduce the global manufacture of IEDs. The War In Afghanistan Was A Generational Experiment On The Effects Of Roadside Bombs In 20 years of fighting ending last week, 2,452 American service members died in combat in Afghanistan. But deaths alone don’t reflect the true cost of a generation of warfare. |
C-IED FORENSIC FACILITIES
European Union Defence Agency C-IED Capabilities Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL)French Barkhane Task Force is believed to have deployed mobile C-IED lab to Niamey DATABASES
ACLED Dashboard ECOWAS WANEP Early Warning and Response Network INTERPOL Project Watchmaker has developed a regional-based model in line with the current IED threats, which is derived from actual incident data. At the heart of the Project Watchmaker initiative is a database that includes information on known and suspected persons involved in the acquisition, manufacture or use of IEDs. World Customs Organization (WCO) World Customs Organization (WCO), which facilitates the exchange of intelligence across all six WCO regions. The WCO uses the Customs Enforcement Network in gathering data and information for intelligence purposes to counter the illegal importation of precursor chemicals and explosives. |
ACADEMIC RESOURCES
How Do Leadership Decapitation and Targeting Error Affect Suicide Bombings? The Case of Al-Shabaab
Mohammed Ibrahim Shire
17 Jun 2020 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1057610X.2020.1780021
Abstract: Targeted killing is a cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy, and tactical mistakes made by militant groups are endemic in terrorism. Yet, how do they affect a militant group’s suicide bomber deployment? Since joining Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabaab has carried out various types of suicide attacks on different targets. Using a uniquely constructed dataset, I introduce two typologies of suicide bomber detonation profiles – single and multiple – and explore the strategic purposes these have served for the group during multiphasic stages following targeted killings against the group’s leadership and targeting errors committed by Al-Shabaab. The findings reveal that targeted killing has the opposite effect of disrupting suicide attacks, instead, leading to a rapid proliferation of unsophisticated single suicide attacks against civilian and military targets to maintain the perception of the group’s potency. Thus, I argue that targeting errors made by Al-Shabaab have a more serious detrimental effect on its deployment of suicide attacks than any counter-terrorism measure.
BOOKS
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